Rather than focusing on elite-level political maneuvering, foreign governments need to recognize the transformative potential of the country’s resistance movement.
A recent analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “War by Other Means: the Tatmadaw’s Transition Test,” attempts to make sense of Myanmar’s latest junta‑run “elections” by invoking the wide‑reaching economic and political reforms of the 2010s. It argues that then, as now, the military never intended a genuine transition to democracy or a durable peace. Yet, in the earlier period, the analysis suggests, the generals ultimately lost control of the process and became exposed to “unintended consequences” that opened political space far beyond what they had anticipated. It suggests that all “international” and “opposition” attention should now be on the potential for shifts and tensions within the military to provide new, unexpected political openings.
The essay provides a useful reminder that the junta’s recent electoral performance, cynical allusions to ceasefire talks, and partial prisoner releases are not intended to deliver democratic change or a pathway to peace. It is also true that the dictator, Min Aung Hlaing, is under significant external and internal pressure and might become exposed to new vulnerabilities that should be exploited by those trying to achieve peace and democracy.
The analysis, however, is undermined by unresolved tensions between what it describes empirically and what its language can be read to imply. Terms such as “transition,” “hybrid system,” and “political space,” and the comparison to the 2010s more broadly, sit uneasily alongside the article’s own evidence that there are no signs of an actual liberalization underway and that all signals point to the successful accumulation of power around Min Aung Hlaing. The article identifies no willingness within the military to compromise with democratic forces, no credible exit or retirement strategy for senior leaders, and no internal counterweight capable of constraining Min Aung Hlaing’s power. It stresses that the appointment of the relatively inexperienced loyalist Ye Win Oo as commander-in-chief has already “dampened hopes” within military circles that parliamentary politics might “dilute Min Aung Hlaing’s power”.
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